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Abstract  
State regulation of charities is increasing. Nevertheless, although religious entities also pursue 
charitable objectives, jurisdictions often regulate them differently. In some states (including 
England until recently) the church (religious charities) are not called to account for their 
common-good contribution, despite owning significant assets and receiving public and 
government income.  
These regulatory and accounting variations emanate from a state’s historically informed 
positional relationship with religion, which may be discordant against increasing religious 
pluralism and citizens’ commonly-held beliefs. To open a debate on state-church relationships 
within the accounting history literature, this paper analyses changes in England since 1534. It 
utilises a state-church framework from Monsma and Soper (2009), combined with an 
application and extension of Foucauldian governmentality. The longitudinal study shows direct 
and indirect governmentality tools change with the state-church relationship. Such 
harmonisation of regulatory approach relies on citizens/entities subverting imposition of state 
demands which fail to meet their concept of common-good.  
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Introduction 
Religious entities comprise some of the most ancient of charities, worldwide. Individual 
citizens’ faith impacts their behaviour, including their accounting (Funnell and Williams, 2014; 
Parker, 2014). Religious organisations’ accounting has also attracted recent scholarship, both 
in respect of their use of accounting internally (for example, Cordery, 2015; Ezzamel, 2005; 
Lightbody, 2000, 2003; Sargiacomo, 2009) and for external purposes (for example, Irvine, 
2002; Yasmin et al, 2014). Much of this research takes an organisational view, although 
jurisdictional context remains important. Less analysis has been undertaken of the interaction 
between religious organisations and the state, or the state’s relationship with both religious and 
secular charities from an accounting or regulatory viewpoint.  
Nevertheless, the interactions between the state, religious entities and secular charities are an 
important feature of the current civil landscape and are informed by past interactions. Charity 
regulation reflects governments’ concern to protect their tax base, increase citizens’ 
philanthropy, and ensure that the entities they contract-out to discharge public accountability 
for donations, grants and payments for services (Cordery, et al., 2017). Charities in many 
countries are now required to maintain accounting systems, and to prepare financial statements 
(sometimes requiring auditing) and to publish these through the charity regulator or to the 
population at large (Cordery and Baskerville, 2007). In many jurisdictions, certain religious 
entities are deemed to be charities. 
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Historically, the definition of ‘charity’ often developed through common law, and therefore the 
entities in the regulatory scope changed over time (Salamon and Anheier, 1997). The definition 
of charity in the (English) 1601 Statute of Elizabeth was interpreted in 1891 by Lord 
Macnaghten as four ‘heads of charity’ (in the Pemsel case - [1891] AC 5311891). These are: 
the relief of poverty; the advancement of education; the advancement of religion; and other 
purposes beneficial to the community (Cordery and Baskerville, 2007). These ‘heads’ formed 
the basic concept of charity in many jurisdictions and, therefore, it is commonly believed that 
entities seeking to achieve objectives under these heads (and subsequent definitional changes) 
would be subject to the relevant jurisdiction’s charity regulation.  
Yet, currently, as well as historically, various jurisdictions treat religious entities (apparently 
formed for the advancement of religion) differently. In some, these entities must comply with 
the same regulation and accounting requirements as secular charities (e.g. New Zealand), in 
others they must register, but are not required to publish financial data (e.g. Australia, the 
United States (US)). A third approach is to exempt some religious entities from registration,  
but due to their special nature, to continue to provide these entities with tax relief and other 
benefits afforded to other registered charities (e.g. England and Wales, Germany, Indonesia). 
Religious charities under the second and third approaches face reduced public scrutiny, hence 
empirical studies have found systematic differences between religious and secular charities 
(DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990). Public interest in religious entities is high, given they often 
own significant assets and receive income from the public and government.  
State regulation that is underpinned by public interest aims to bring about the “common-good” 
(Cordery and Deguchi, 2018), as such, it could be expected to mould the behaviour of charities 
(and religious organisations) to commonly-held ideals. For Foucault (1988, 1991), 
governmentality can be observed in regulation and similar interventionist disciplines. 
Nevertheless, the question must be asked, does state governmentality over religion achieve the 
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common-good? And who decides what that common-good is? If one religion is given 
preference, is this representative of commonly-held beliefs? To what extent have these beliefs 
changed and how is this reflected in governmentality tools? This paper analyses state 
sponsorship of religion historically, through the accounting and regulatory lens of 
governmentality (Foucault, 1988, 1991). It contrasts the state’s relationship with the church to 
that with secular charities. The context chosen is England, as it provides an example for 
longitudinal study of the change in commonly-held beliefs over time, of differential and 
increasing regulation of both charity and church, and therefore, different governmentality tools. 
Further, when Henry VIII established the English Church in 1535 “for the common-good”, the 
state strongly supported it, and the church still enjoys a ‘structurally privileged position’ within 
the state (Monsma and Soper, 2009: 142). While it could be argued that an international 
comparative study would also meet the objective of this paper, the richness of English history, 
the early regulation of church and charity and the manner in which the government continues 
to influence the church was persuasive in this choice of context. 
In observing a limited number of state interventions, this paper analyses the English 
government’s persuasion of citizens to attend the Church of England (1534-1688) (including 
through church-run enquiries); regulatory governmentality tools that increased the visibility of 
both church and charity assets (1689-1894); and then the evolutionary (relative) harmonisation 
of regulatory and accounting demands on both church and charity (1895-present). These show 
a swing from a state-supported church towards one of state neutrality (see below), without the 
final push to disassociation from the state-supported church. Monsma and Soper (2009) 
describe this as ‘partial establishment’. While the state-church enjoys charitable status, less-
established religious entities may still struggle to register as charities, despite asserting they 
meet the longstanding charitable head of “advancing religion”.  
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This paper presents historical evidence, tracking changes in the governmentality tools used, 
and by inference, notions of the common-good. Yet it observes that vestiges of the state-church 
relationship restrict the current regulator’s ability to reflect commonly-held beliefs. Regulatory 
structures fail to reflect an increasingly pluralist and globalised society, although recent charity 
regulation changes in England and Wales point to ways to resolve past structural issues. State 
contracting-out to religious and secular charities also recognises increasing pluralism. 
Accordingly, the objective of this research is to open a debate about the church-state 
relationship and the appropriate tools to serve the common-good. This is relevant not only to 
England, but to other jurisdictions where certain religious entities enjoy privileges 
disassociated from the common-good. The contributions are three-fold. First, the research 
applies a new framework in the accounting history literature by viewing the extant literature 
through the Monsma and Soper (2009) framework of state-church relationships. This 
framework provides a mechanism to view these relational interactions and the forces of change 
and thus, in this paper, it is applied through a longitudinal case study of England. The second 
contribution is the application and extension of Foucauldian governmentality over three 
distinct periods to further theorise the Monsma and Soper (2009) framework and these 
relational changes. Through these two contributions, the paper thus makes a third contribution, 
of opening the state-church relationship debate within the accounting history literature and 
providing opportunities for comparative research. 
The paper continues by establishing a framework informed by legal and accounting studies 
through which relationships between state and church can be understood, before the theoretical 
framework (Foucauldian governmentality) is introduced. England’s state-church relationship 
over an extended period (from the establishment of a state-supported church to the present day) 
is analysed through secondary sources and legislation to show tools the state has used as it 
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moulds the state-supported church and secular charities. The discussion section that follows 
highlights opportunities for further research, before the conclusions. 
Religion (“church”) and State – a framework 
The current day evidences an increasingly pluralistic society, partly due to growing liberalism 
and globalisation (Woodhead, 2016). In addition, travel and migration introduce new cultures, 
religious beliefs and practices, or secularism. Current events also evidence intolerance of such 
different beliefs and practices. Members of established religions may discriminate against those 
asserting new religious beliefs, and persecution may lead to physical and mental violence. 
Nevertheless, some new religious practices not only challenge established religions, but may 
also be illegal. Such practices include polygamy and overt homophobia. Further, some 
jurisdictions’ legal requirements may be antithetical to specific religious beliefs (e.g. 
conscription). Hence, some states welcome a close relationship with a specific 
religion/denomination, in order to develop and support common values and beliefs, hoping to 
build a homogeneous society (Ezzamel, 1997; Monsma and Soper, 2009). Thus, states may 
restrict “religious extremists” and potential societal disruption; states also may design 
definitions of “religion” to suggest a particular “common-good”. For example, in 2016 “The 
Temple of the Jedi Order” (the worship of the mythology of Star Wars) was declined charitable 
status in England and Wales, despite 177,000 people declaring themselves to be Jedi in the 
2011 census.1 The Charity Commission argued that the “Jedi Doctrine” lacks sufficient 
structure/rules to be a religion and is not focused on public benefit (common-good) per se.2 On 
the contrary, in 2015 the Internal Revenue Service of the US recognised the Jedi Order as a 
charity (McEachren, 2017). Beliefs as to common-good differ and, as shown in this paper, have 
changed over time. 
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Historically, religion and state (as understood in different periods) have often been inseparable. 
As shown in prior accounting history research, in Ancient Egypt (particularly the Old Kingdom 
– 2700-2200 BC), the state was ‘personified by its ruler, the god King’ (Ezzamel, 1997: 569) 
(caesaropapism). Accordingly, Ezzamel (2002: 97) treats the mortuary cults of the pharaohs of 
the Middle Kingdom of Egypt (approximately 2050-1780 BC) as a branch of the state, as: ‘a 
symbiotic relationship, ensued between the two’. Thus, these cults were also exempt from tax. 
Accounting controls were essential to ensure the continuation of the temples’ redistributive 
cycles (Ezzamel, 2005, 2009, 2012), but not to coerce adherence.  
The Jerusalem temple (c.823 BC. to 70 AD), provides another example of a state-church 
relationship, as the King was an important participant in the temple’s internal controls 
(Fonfeder et al., 2003): the periods of building and rebuilding of the Jewish temple by 
subsequent Kings are covered in the Biblical books of Kings and Chronicles. Fleischer (2010) 
provides the example from Genesis 47:24, when Joseph (as second-in-charge in Egypt) 
exempted the priests from the pharaoh’s tax.  
Kuasirikun and Constable’s (2010) study considers Thailand in the early-nineteenth century 
(AD), millennia later. Accounting allowed the god King to support Buddhism as the state 
religion. However, accounting and taxation generally centred on the economy and temporal, 
rather than spiritual matters (Kuasirikun and Constable, 2010).  
Monsma and Soper’s (2009) continuum catgeorises relationships between religious entities and 
the state. These are: at one end - strict separation between church and state;3 at the other end – 
an established church supported by the state. In the middle, the pluralist model acknowledges 
that the state comprises many spheres (e.g. education, business, governmental, etc.) which may 
compete or be complementary, but that religion has a bearing across all (Monsma and Soper, 
2009). In the central pluralist “neutral” position, the state does not favour or burden any 
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particular religion, allows citizens’ freedom in their religion/faith choice and is even-handed 
towards all faiths or none (Monsma and Soper, 2009). 
The notion of “state” developed in the early-modern period (late-fifteenth to late-eighteenth 
century), when ‘several Western European states experienced the transition from the 
configuration of the feudal state to the modern one’ (Gatti and Poli, 2014: 475). As power had 
been centralised in Kings and Popes, initially the modern state commonly supported an 
established church (including in the emergent US4). Yet, due to the Glorious Revolution in 
England in 1688, the American Revolution (1776) and the French Revolution (1793), civilians 
rejected the divine right of Kings, and democratic rule ensued.5 Late-seventeenth and 
eighteenth century enlightenment liberalist views favoured secular government, freedom of 
speech and democracy. Today, this secularist push threatens the existence of established 
religious bodies, as liberals question the need for religion at all (Woodhead, 2016). 
Nevertheless, these liberalists’ advocacy for greater equality and civil rights is also held by 
many religions.  
The Christian religion is not alone in having state-church relationships. For example, Hamid et 
al. (1993: 134) suggest that Muslims in Islamic societies previously structured their business 
affairs strictly in accord with the dictates of their religion, and there is ‘growing evidence of 
pressures for them to do so’. Notably, there has been research into state support of Islamic 
banking in Pakistan (Hamid et al., 1993; Rammal and Parker, 2012) and Jordan (Maali and 
Napier, 2010). Further; India, Indonesia, Malaysia, many Middle Eastern and North African 
countries also are governed by the Islamic laws of Shari’a, cementing state support for Islam 
(see, for example, Altaher et al., 2014 discussing Kuwait; Irvine, 2008 discussing the UAE). 
This is not the case in Indonesia, where Efferin and Hopper (2007: 230) suggest that, ‘Moslems 
disagree whether the state should be secular or follow Islamic law’.  
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Of particular relevance to this research are the waqfs, Islamic religious endowments of revenue-
earning property made by wealthy citizens for the common-good (Yayla, 2011) and therefore 
similar to the notion of charity. Rothstein and Broms (2013) generalise that until the twentieth 
century, Islamic states in the Middle East and North Africa had little authority over waqfs and 
their activities, which are private endeavours.6 On the contrary, Melčák (2010) argues that the 
state increasingly regulated waqfs in nineteenth century Egypt, with Muhammad cAlī’s dīwān 
requiring registration, adherence to strict rules restricting fund use to religious purposes only 
and confiscation (or reclassification) of non-compliant waqfs. While similarly Turkish waqfs 
were state-regulated from 1826 in order to redress shortcomings in their accountability to 
government, Yayla (2011) suggests this regulation resulted from increasing secularism, rather 
than theocratic control. Hence Rothstein and Broms’ (2013) generalisation does not hold for 
all periods/states. Increasing pluralism means that Islamic institutions are establishing in 
jurisdictions where there is a Christian state-church (e.g. England), but we argue that their 
ability to do so will be dependant on that state and its position in the Monsma and Soper (2009) 
framework.  
Approach and method 
England has been chosen as a case study to meet this paper’s objective to open a debate and to 
analyse longitudinally the state-church relationship and tools used to serve the common good. 
As noted, this country provides a longitudinal example of changes in commonly-held beliefs, 
of different governmentality tools and most importantly, an initially strong state-church 
relationship, the vestiges of which remain today. Yet, the current state-church relationship is 
not one of neutrality, despite growing secularisation and pluralism. Therefore, extant 
governmentality tools are as instructive as those of the past.  
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The study is split into three periods over more than five centuries and therefore necessarily is 
limited by the selection of events in each period. Nevertheless, Monsma and Soper’s (2009) 
framework and (as noted below) Foucault’s governmentality guide the choice of events. 
Through these periods, understandings of the terms “state” and “church”, as well as “charity”, 
have changed, as already indicated. The research utilises an approach similar to that of Foucault 
(1967) in not providing a micro-history, but discussing regulation and accounting interventions 
which change with the state-church relationship. Specifically, as the relationship moves from 
a state-supported church at one end of the Monsma and Soper (2009) continuum, towards state-
church neutrality in the middle, without reaching that point, the governmentality tools shape 
each stage. As with any interpretation of historical events and documents, different viewpoints 
could have emerged and a balance must be struck between depth and breadth. Due to the 
changes in England’s state-church relationship, and the role of accounting and regulation over 
a long period, concentrating on one jurisdiction was preferred over an international 
comparative study, although comparisons could also be insightful.  
Foucault (1988, 1991) drew on French administrative/policing practices to develop his 
governmentality approach, analysing governmental management of individuals. 
Governmentality (state’s “policing” of the moral quality of life) normalises interventionist 
discipline as the state argues this is for the common-good (Foucault, 1988, 1991). Nevertheless, 
the common-good is a generalist notion, and the state is not the final arbiter, despite its power. 
Discipline is applied to that which is visible and, by increasing visibility, accounting makes 
individuals, groups and organisations governable. Other disciplinary tools include those 
emanating from religion (for example, confession - Aho, 2005). 
Governmentality is a commonly-used theoretical framework in accounting history studies. For 
example, Miller and Rose (1990) use governmentality to analyse governments’ centralised 
economic planning, and regulation requiring economic actors to undertake calculative 
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practices, which encourages these actors to self-regulate and recognise they are not entirely 
autonomous. Further, Miller and O’Leary (1993) find governmentality increases the use of 
costing and governance within organisations. While Foucault argues that governmentality is 
evident in modern political thought and action, a number of Italian accounting history studies 
also show how governmentality tools (specifically accountability demands) increase or 
maintain state or religious power (e.g. Bigoni and Funnell, 2015; Gatti and Poli, 2014; 
Madonna et al., 2014; Sargiacomo, 2009). Additionally Yayla (2011) records the requirements 
for nineteenth century Egyptian waqfs to use new accounting and calculative techniques, 
inspection, and return surpluses to the government. These all represent examples of 
governmentality which accords “action at a distance” as, even when entities may appear to 
operate autonomously in the short term, a web of regulation affords visibility to performance, 
which must (re)conform to the government’s expectations (Miller and Rose, 1990).  
Viewing the state-church relationship in England over the following sections, it can be seen 
that different tools have been devised in different periods to make the church (and charities) 
governable. These tools depict changing rationalities. In the first period (1534-1688), 
governmentality tools aimed to form the state church and also to require citizens to attend. In 
the second period (1689-1894) citizens forced the state to tolerate dissension and the state 
expanded its governmentality tools to secular charities. In the third period (1895-present), the 
focus of these governmentality tools more closely align the state-church with secular and other 
religious charities, as the state-church relationship moves towards neutrality (a “partial 
establishment” – Monsma and Soper, 2009). In assessing these relational changes, this study 
adds to theory by linking governmentality tools to changes in the espoused common-good over 
time. Nevertheless, these tools of governmentality are also slow and difficult to change, leaving 
vestiges of past state-policing, despite new conceptions of the common-good. 
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The research utilises secondary data and legislation spanning more than five centuries, although 
it preferences nineteenth and twentieth century sources. Census data is useful (as recommended 
by Bisman, 2009), hence this paper draws on available seventeenth, nineteenth and twenty-first 
census data that demonstrates how the state-church relationship moved towards the centre of 
Monsma and Soper’s (2009) continuum. This research focuses on the Church of England and 
its relationship with the English state, despite the current charity regulator also covering Wales. 
There is no separate English Parliament (unlike the devolution to the other jurisdictions in the 
United Kingdom), as from 1707 Her Majesty’s Government oversaw the Kingdom of Great 
Britain, from 1801-1922 Great Britain and Ireland, and in the current day Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. Yet with only one recent exception, all Members of Parliament vote on laws 
regulating England (Morgan and Morris, 2017). The Appendix summarises the Acts used in 
this paper. 
England and the state-church 
As noted, this study is presented in three sub-sections; the first introduces the state-church of 
the sixteenth century, outlining the Church of England’s inception and the state’s moves to 
police citizens’ adherence to the state-church. It ends with a state census of religious adherence 
and the Glorious Revolution (1688). The second sub-section spans from the Toleration Act 
1689 through the nineteenth century, to the disassociation of local government from the church 
in 1894. It includes regulation of charities and another religious census. Citizen support for the 
state-church weakens over the period, but the church is required by the state to discipline 
secular charities. In return, it receives continued support. The third sub-section (from 1895-
present) includes the harmonising changes in the Charites Act 2006 and the results of the most 
recent census of religious adherence. Governmentality over charities and the state-church 




Introduction: A state-supported church (1534-1688)  
A new state-church relationship: making religious wealth calculable (1534-1688) 
When King Henry VIII (reigned 1509-1547) failed to gain an annulment of his first marriage 
(to Catherine of Aragon) from Pope Clement, he renounced papal authority and established the 
Church of England. In addition to allowing him to marry a further five times, not only did this 
establish a state-supported church, but the state (King) progressively scrutinised and 
appropriated (Roman Catholic) church wealth and income. Initially, the King restricted 
excesses in church commercialisation, including that trading of leases and tithes by religious 
houses. For example, the Acts of 1529 (see the Appendix) curtailed the church’s demands of 
unreasonable mortuary tax by stating maximum fees chargeable, limited priests’ incomes 
(including prohibiting the buying and selling of goods for a profit), and reduced the ability of 
the church to lease land out for inappropriate activities (see also the 1531 Act on leasing). 
Absentee priests were also sanctioned.7 The 1534 (tithing) statute required churches to pay 
10% of their income to the Crown.8  
In 1535 the King commissioned local gentry and other leaders to survey church wealth through 
the Valor Ecclisasticus. Palmer (2002) notes that 837 monasteries controlled more than a tenth 
of the country’s wealth, despite their staff representing less than half a percent of the 
population. When the church as a whole was included (and omitting leasehold investments), 
Palmer (2002: 215) estimates it ‘controlled between 20 percent and 25 percent of the landed 
wealth of late-medieval England’. In addition, approximately 3300 of 9000 parishes were 
owned by monasteries, many being leased out. In a bid for this wealth, in 1534, Henry VIII 
assumed headship of the Church of England and began dissolution of the Roman Catholic 
monasteries (1534 statutes: see the Appendix), although more than 70 monasteries initially 
escaped suppression by paying fines levied upon them in 1535 (Palmer, 2002). 
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The Valor Ecclisasticus made visible the dissolution database and by 1540 all monasteries were 
closed (Palmer, 2002). The annual income from these confiscated estates was three times the 
King’s income from his traditional estates; wealth that was augmented by the significant 
treasures captured from monasteries, the King’s collection of what had been papal taxes, and 
his on-selling of church leases and lands (Palmer, 2002). In addition to annexation of its wealth, 
the church lost political power, as abbots were no longer deemed to be Lords Spiritual; thus 
bishops became the minority in the House of Lords.  
The 1535 and 1537 Acts empowered the Crown to sanction clergy who mismanaged parishes 
in their charge, as the King now controlled both the ecclesiastical and civil courts. Palmer 
(2002) argues that citizens were also empowered to sanction clergy, especially as anyone could 
sue, and the first to do so could receive half the judgment penalty. However, Haigh (1982) is 
less sanguine about the power of the reformation “from below” or its country-wide spread. 
Nevertheless, the 1537 statute of uses and wills meant the church could not seize back its land 
through the ecclesiastical courts, as these courts had been limited to spiritual matters rather 
than also hearing cases on church property, probates and usury. Yet, the civil and ecclesiastical 
courts continued to be played off against each other well into the nineteenth century (Best, 
1964) and church parishes continued to be synonymous with what became local authorities in 
the late nineteenth century. 
State-church and citizen: legislation and a census (1534-1689) 
Following the death of Henry VIII and his son Edward VI, Mary I (reigned 1553-1558) 
aggressively attempted to swing England back to Roman Catholicism. Her successor, Elizabeth 
I (reigned 1558-1603) not only reinstated the English state-church relationship but began 
policing citizens’ religious beliefs towards a perceived common-good (of church attendance). 
For example, she passed the Act of Uniformity 1558, prescribing a mandatory standard form 
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of worship service. Similar to other ‘mono-confessional’ territories in Europe, conformity was 
rewarded and nonconformity penalised (Gibson, 2008; Madeley, 2003), with the 1558 Act 
imposing a 12d “nonconformist” fine on citizens who did not attend the Church of England at 
least weekly. Citizens were also made visible to the state through Diocesan Population Returns 
in 1563 and 1603. Property owners (or occupiers) were required to pay a poor tax to their local 
parish under the 1601 Poor Relief Act. 
James I (reigned 1603-1625) (who ordered the translation of the Bible into the King James 
Version) was followed by Charles I (reigned 1625-1649) who was executed during the English 
Civil War (1642-1651). Religious freedoms began for nonconformists as Oliver Cromwell 
dominated the Parliament and then ruled as Lord Protector from 1653-1658 (his son ruled until 
1659). From 1649-1660, the bishops were dethroned as more far-reaching Protestant reforms 
were sought. Yet, by 1660, the monarchy and bishops were re-established, but with the proviso 
that the monarchy required government consent to reign. The “monopoly” of the state-church 
had ended, despite Charles II (reigned 1660–1685) legislating to enshrine conformist practices 
in 1662 and return the state-church to its sixteenth century position.  
The conformist/nonconformist diversity in views of the common-good are evident from the 
1676 “Compton” survey. Bishop Compton was authorised by the state to survey all Church of 
England clergy as to their parish’s inhabitants, “Papists” (Roman Catholics) and dissenters. 
Unfortunately his instructions were vague and some clergy may have understood the term 
“inhabitants” as “conformists” (i.e. their parishioners), or counted only all “heads of 
households”, only males, both men and women, or the whole population (Snell and Ell, 2004). 
Whiteman’s (1986) adjustments to standardise data ameliorated some of these problems, but 
she noted that the evidence about the strength of dissent in 1676 was ‘patchy and inconsistent’. 
As shown in the middle column of Table 1, 95 percent of citizens were noted to be adherents 
to the state-church, with less than four percent being dissenters and a fraction under one percent 
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being Roman Catholics. The religious beliefs of these dissenting citizens were made visible 
and they experienced social exclusions, including electoral excommunication (Gibson, 2008).  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Upon the death of Charles II, James II reigned from 1685-88 as the last Roman Catholic 
monarch. Fears of a return to absolute monarchy (and Roman Catholicism) led to the Glorious 
Revolution, his overthrow and the requirement that all future monarchs be Protestant (i.e. 
Church of England). 
One step towards the centre: unbundling the state from the church (1689-1894) 
Notions of the common-good were changing. Parliament passed the Toleration Act 1689,9 
allowing Protestants freedom of worship (those willing to pledge an oath of allegiance to the 
Crown), but not Roman Catholics who supported transubstantiation.10 This pressure suggests 
that the common-good now encapsulated a wider brief than merely the state-church. The 1689 
Act more aptly represented common beliefs and represented a “carrot” encouraging 
Protestantism (Gibson, 2008). While citizens were no longer required to support the state-
church (Gibson, 1994), nonconformist discrimination continued, due to the suspicion that 
religious toleration was incompatible to civil stability (Madeley, 2003). For example, the 1812 
Parochial Registers Act failed to allow for dissenters to register baptisms, marriages and deaths. 
What impact does this period have on the state-church relationship in respect of local 
government, charities and citizens? 
State and church: governmentality reforming the relationship (1689-1894) 
The state-church relationship of the seventeenth century impacted many features of England’s 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Gibson, 1994). In addition, the Industrial Revolution 
encouraged new beliefs in order, statistics and discipline and also led to governmental reform. 
Beginning in the 1770s, reforms concluded with the Great Reform Act 1832 when ‘offices of 
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state were overhauled, municipal corporations reformed, and even the established church was 
probed by an exhilarating breeze of inquiry and reform’ (Tompson, 1979: 2). The state still 
deemed the Church of England to be ‘necessary towards the promotion of religion and 
morality’ (43 Geo. 3 c.108 (1803)) i.e. for the common-good, but expected the Lords Spiritual 
to support the government. Therefore, until about the 1830s, Laughlin (1988: 31) suggests that 
church and state ‘lived amicably together’. Indeed, this period of strong state scrutiny of the 
church was inter-twined with support.  
One governmentality tool was Bacon’s 1786 edition of Ecton’s Liber Valorum (a parish 
census), which, along with other statistical evidence, made visible the physical and financial 
conditions of parishes. These informed the reports of the Church Building Commission of 
1818, Commissioners for Building New Churches (from 1821), Commission of Inquiry into 
Ecclesiastical Revenues (1832-35) and, from the 1830s onwards (when it was recognised that 
parliament was ill-suited to such specialist decisions), the Ecclesiastical Commission (Best, 
1964; Field, 2009). Further, parliament continued to support the state-church through ‘Church 
Building Acts, notably those of 1818–19, 1822, 1845, 1856’ (Snell and Ell, 2004: 26), and 
amendments in 1838 and 1840 (Cooke and Harwood, 1867). The outcome of these 
commissions and Acts benefitted the Church of England through £1.5 million in government 
grants from 1818-1824 (as well as a further £4.5 million from individuals) (Snell and Ell, 2004) 
for building, repairing and otherwise maintaining churches. Gibson (1994): 129) notes this was 
a period of closer political church and state relations, stemming from a belief that the “State 
had a duty to regulate and reform the Church”.  
The affairs of the state-church were required to be increasingly visible to the state through: 
annual reports from ‘the Governors of Queen Anne’s Bounty (from 1837), Tithe 
Commissioners (from 1837-38), Ecclesiastical Commissioners (from 1846), and Church 
Estates Commissioners (from 1852)’ (Field, 2009: 4).11 The Ecclesiastical Commissioners Act 
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1836, the work preceding it, and the subsequent similarly named Acts are examples of a 
powerful state re-shaping the church through making visible its assets and revenues. Further, 
the Ecclesiastical Commissioners ‘was founded with wide-ranging powers to confiscate the 
wealth of the bishops and cathedrals, and return to a more balanced allocation of resources, 
giving the bishops little option but to return to their important spiritual role’ (Laughlin, 1988: 
31).  
The state-church attempted to reduce Parliamentary interference (governmentality) (Laughlin, 
1988) but it remained answerable to the Crown. Five bishops (including the Archbishops of 
Canterbury and York), the Lord Chancellor, principal officer of state and three laymen formed 
the Ecclesiastical Commission and were empowered to purchase and consolidate church land 
to meet the recommendations in the initial report of the Commission and satisfy the King to 
this effect; indeed they became the national governing board of the Church of England (Best, 
1964).12  
The final stage of reform in this period was to complete the detachment of the ecclesiastical 
parish from the civil parish and to establish local government separate from the church (see 
1894 Act). This was the culmination of redrawing parish boundaries and re-allocating 
endowments from inactive to active parishes (see, for example, the Parochial Church Act 1883) 
(Fishman, 2005). Unbundling of civil and ecclesiastical parishes created a new relationship 
between state and church as the latter finally lost its power over secular civil issues. 
State-church and (secular) charities: Governmentality reforming charity (1689-1894) 
Returning to the late-eighteenth century, this sub-section considers other 
churches/denominations and secular charities which, during this period, governmentality tools 
made increasingly visible. The state-church was required to assist in this endeavour. The 
increase in the establishment of secular charities and benevolent societies coincided with 
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government concerns about tax avoidance, with the 1798 Tax Act threatening increased 
visibility to secular and other religious charities (the church was exempt). Unsurprisingly, 
charities protested (Tompson, 1979), forcing the Assessed Taxes Act 1799 to exempt entities 
‘established for charitable purposes only’. From 1805, such exemptions were provided as 
“relief” by the Commissioners for the Special Purposes of the Income Tax (Gousmett, 2009).13 
Many charities were also able to claim relief from land tax, house duty, stamp duty, legacy 
duty, the poor and church rates, with such rebates apparently recognising their input to the 
common-good (Tompson, 1979).  
Due to citizens’ concerns about charity mismanagement, parliament undertook enquiries 
(Tompson, 1979), requiring the church to assist it by making visible the operations of secular 
charities (through 1786 Acts and the “Gilbert Returns” on the availability of poor relief). This 
was despite disquiet that the state-church also experienced similar mismanagement to the 
charities they were being asked to report on. Clergy were required to make visible local secular 
charities benefiting the poor (particularly their donations) (Fishman, 2005; Gousmett, 2009). 
Unsurprisingly, their returns show evidence of secular charity mismanagement (Fishman, 
2005). These returns and general enthusiasm for select committees and enquiries from the late-
eighteenth century saw the 1816 Select Committee on the Education of the Lower Classes in 
the Metropolis being re-formed by Lord Chancellor Brougham as a Charity Commission in 
1818 – it received two more extensions before ceasing in 1837 (Tompson, 1979). Similarly to 
the 1786 Gilbert Returns, the Charity Commissioners required the church to make visible all 
secular charities in each parish, the founders, purpose and current trustees and then examined 
these. Nearly ninety percent of the more than 26,000 charities examined by 1834 were found 
to be in order, with only 400 being ‘referred to the Attorney General for prosecution… Another 
2,100 trusts were reformed or renovated in some way’ (Fishman, 2005: 739). 
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Despite the threat of more state regulation, it took at least ten bills before a permanent Charity 
Commission for England and Wales was established (in 1853). While the 1860 Act endowed 
substantial judicial powers to reform secular charities, the state-church was excepted from the 
Charities Act 1860 (s. XLVI), was not required to register with the Charity Commission, or to 
prepare and file accounts with the court (s. LXI).14 Some other charities also received 
exemptions (s. LXII).15 Thus, while the state-church was no longer required to report on 
miscreant charities, it enjoyed exemption from governmentality tools until well into the 
twentieth century (see next section).  
State-church and citizen: governmentality and reform (1689-1894) 
The Glorious Revolution brought more religious freedom and thus, heightened religious 
pluralism. Nevertheless, state governmentality tools continued to be applied to citizens. In 
comparison to the prior period, the state treated dissenters less harshly, although Roman 
Catholics continued to be discriminated against. Later, upon the Union of Great Britain and 
Ireland, and following the 1829 election to the Westminster Parliament of a Dublin Barrister 
and Roman Catholic (Daniel O’Connell), the Roman Catholic Relief Act (1829) was passed, 
granting these believers the freedom to practise, to vote and to serve in Parliament (Maclear, 
1995).16 This represented a loosening of the prior governmentality. 
Yet, religion was still held as a common-good. The state noted concern that the rapid industrial 
and demographic changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution had severely strained the 
state-church; that it did not meet people’s needs and that working people ‘were gravitating 
towards anti-establishment denominations’ (Snell and Ell, 2004: 25). The ten yearly 
(decennial) census which began in 1811 did not ask citizens about their religious adherence, 
despite probing other societal data.17 Hence, to ascertain the veracity of its concerns, as part of 
the decennial census in 1851, the state required every place of worship in Britain to return the 
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number and dates of construction of churches/chapels (if after 1800), the capacity of these 
worship houses (“sittings”) and the total number of attendances at all services held on 30 March 
1851 (“attendances”) (Snell and Ell, 2004).18 Church of England parishes were also required 
to return income sources (e.g. pew rents, fees, dues) and endowments, and Quaker meeting 
houses to report their property area to enable an estimate of sittings (Snell and Ell, 2004). The 
logic for utilising attendances rather than requiring citizens to state their adherence was to 
reduce the likelihood of respondent bias arising due to the fear of confessing dissent (Snell and 
Ell, 2004). However, as the results were not compared to the total population, there was no 
mechanism to include those who did not attend church/did not profess Christian faith. A total 
of 34,427 returns were received from England and Wales as shown in Table 2. Only 3,395 were 
received from Scotland and the originals of these are no longer available for analysis (Snell 
and Ell, 2004). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 shows a large number of dissenting churches. Attendance varied regionally, with 
particular denominations being popular in certain districts. These churches also varied as to 
whether they had a centralised religious hierarchy (as with the Presbyterians, Methodists, 
Mormons) or were independent at the “parish” level (as with the Independents, Baptists, 
Quakers, Unitarians) (Snell and Ell, 2004; Morgan, 2009a).19 While Roman Catholics had been 
repressed until 1829, ‘there had been a significant Catholic (and to some extent Irish) presence 
in English towns’ (Snell and Ell, 2004: 173). The 1845-9 Irish famine caused many Irish to 
change from being seasonal workers in England to permanently migrating and, while it cannot 
be assumed that all Irish migrants would be practising Roman Catholics, many were. In the 
years following the 1851 census, the Roman Catholic Church rapidly expanded, helped also by 
French émigrés (Gibson, 1994). 
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The final column of Table 2 shows the index of attendance calculated by Snell and Ell (2004), 
being total attendance as a percentage of the returns from each district. The Church of 
England’s index of attendances was 48.6 percent overall, although it ranged from 6.2-99.2 in 
different districts. Decline in citizen support of the state-church is also evident from Snell and 
Ell’s (2004) comparison of the 1676 Compton survey and the 1851 census across 12 matched 
counties, although it remained stronger than any other denomination and was present in all 624 
registration districts in England and Wales (Snell and Ell, 2004) (see Table 1). It should be also 
noted that Compton’s 1676 survey measured expressed adherence, while the 1851 survey 
measured attendance at services on a particular day. In both cases, the state required clergy to 
make visible, citizens’ commonly-held beliefs which did not wholeheartedly support its state-
church. 
This census data showing 41.65% of the attendances were at the main Protestant dissenting 
churches was far more than commonly recognised (Gibson, 1994). Dissenters’ business 
success is renowned, given their exclusion from Oxford and Cambridge Universities and high 
levels of social discrimination (Funnell and Williams, 2014; Parker, 2014). Although the 
Church of England remained strong, it was now ‘one denomination among many’ (Gibson, 
1994: 171). Hence, compulsory church rates were abolished in 1868 (Ellens, 1987). 
Further towards the centre and neutrality (1895-present) 
The dismantling of church (parish) local government, religious pluralism and the rise of secular 
charities leads to the present-day evidence of governmentality in the state-church relationship, 
the interplay with charities and citizens’ expressed adherence, as well as examples of increasing 
state neutrality. 
State and church: governmentality reforming the relationship (1895-present) 
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Increasing dislocation of state and church and pressure for self-government led to the Church 
of England Assembly (Powers) Act (Enabling Act) 1919 enabling the General Synod of the 
‘Church of England to pass “measures” to do with its internal management, but which still, in 
certain circumstances, needed to be ratified by Parliament’ (Laughlin, 1988: 32). (For example, 
in 2014 the church required parliamentary approval to be able to appoint female Bishops - The 
Church Commissioners, 2014). Following this 1919 Act, Laughlin (1988) notes the church had 
a “complex agenda” to manage its own (now centralised) finances, its spiritual remit and its 
changed church-state relationship.20 By 1948 the Queens Anne’s Bounty Fund and 
Ecclesiastical Commissioners were re-formed as the Church Commissioners (see note 11) 
setting the scene for a further drawing away from the extreme of a state-supported church. 
State-church and (secular) charities: governmentality reforms (1895-present) 
Next, state governmentality tools focused on secular charities, with the Charities Act 1960 
creating the first systematic charities register and requiring them to keep accounts. While the 
Commissioners could require larger charities to file these accounts, they seldom used this 
power (Morgan, 2010). Later, the Charities Act 1993 required larger secular charities (but not 
excepted or exempted charities) to follow a Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) and 
file accounts and, depending on size and structure, have them independently examined or 
audited (Morgan, 2010).21 Accounting and regulatory changes occurred at regular intervals 
until the most recent Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Act 2016.  
The state-church was not entirely exempt, as, consequent upon the introduction of accounting 
regulation for secular charities (see Charities Act 1993), accounting regulations were also 
introduced for Church of England entities by General Synod in 1997. These entities were 
required to “generally follow” Charities Act Regulations (i.e. the SORP), and provide annual 
accounts and additional activity information for parishioners at their Annual Parochial Church 
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Meeting (Business Committee of the General Synod of the Church of England, 2002). Morgan 
(2009b) found compliance with General Synod requirements was patchy and until the Charities 
Act 2006, Church of England parishes and dioceses were excepted from registering or 
publishing accounts with the Charity Commission. 
The definitional changes in the term “charity” though the Charities Act 2006 brought the most 
significant change in the relationship between the state, the church and other charities. While 
implied in the fourth ‘head of charity’ (purposes beneficial to the community), it had long been 
presumed that charities established for the other three “heads” (relief of poverty, advancement 
of education and/or religion) automatically delivered public benefit (Morgan, 2012). As a result 
of strong lobbying for ‘a single definition based on a new concept of public benefit’ (Morgan, 
2012: 74), the Cabinet Office (2002: para 4.18) recommended there be ten purposes of charity 
but that ‘there is a need to apply the public benefit test more consistently’. Thus, the 
presumption was removed that charities established under the first three heads (as above) were 
also formed for the public benefit (Morgan, 2012). Unsurprisingly, this caused angst amongst, 
for example, fee-charging educational institutions, but it also meant that entities formed for the 
advancement of religion were not now presumed to be also formed for the public benefit, 
despite many local (non-state-church) churches being excepted from registration under the 
Charities Exception from Registration Regulations 1996 (Morgan, 2009a; see also Charities 
Act 2011 s. 30). Since 31 January 2009 all excepted entities with over £100,000 in annual 
revenue have been required to register as charities (including the Church Commissioners). If a 
charity complies with the requirements in the Finance Act 2010 (Sched. 6, para. 7), it may 
obtain taxation relief on ‘(a) income tax (b) capital gains tax, (c) corporation tax, (d) value 
added tax, (e) inheritance tax, (f) stamp duty, (g) stamp duty land tax, and (h) stamp duty 
reserve tax’.22 Registered charities with an annual income over £25,000 must file their annual 
accounts with the Charity Commission of England and Wales. Charitable companies and all 
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charities with an income in excess of £250,000 must file accrual accounts which comply with 
the Charity SORP, while others can file receipts and payments accounts (Morgan, 2017). As 
from 1 April 2008, charities must also file a Trustees Annual Report, including narrative 
information about activities the charity has undertaken to further their charitable purposes for 
the public benefit.  
Nevertheless, Church of England corporations (ecclesiastical corporations), the glebe lands 
held by Diocesan Boards of Finance or their consecrated property trusts are not governed by 
the same Charities Act 2011 (see s. 10). They are instead governed by the General Synod of 
the Church of England through its various statutes that are English law. Further, Church of 
England churches and chapels are not required to be registered under the Places of Worship 
Registration Act 1855, although they receive similar relief (i.e. rate relief on meeting houses) 
to other religious entities that are so registered.  
Therefore, while the Charities Act 2011, as a governmentality tool, has increasingly 
harmonised charity and state-church regulation and accounting requirements, continued 
disparity exists between various segments of the state-church and other charities. Only when 
both regulators (the General Synod of the Church of England and the Charity Commission) 
monitor in a similar manner, will the letter of the law be applied equally. As noted by Morgan 
(2009a: 360-1):  
… in a modern society comprising people of all faiths and none, it would be 
anachronistic for Christian churches to continue to receive the benefits of charitable 
status without the normal standards of accountability. 
In a recent study, Yasmin et al. (2014) suggest that religious entities in England comply with 
mandated accountability reasonably well, but that the Charity Commission’s recommended 
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disclosures which are voluntary are less-well complied with, suggesting lower levels of public 
accountability. 
State-church and citizen: Governmentality and reform (specifically 2001 and 2011 census) 
Returning to citizens, the state did not offer the public the opportunity to note their professed 
beliefs in decennial population surveys until 2001 and 2011 (a question on religion was also 
included in the Labour Force Survey and Citizenship Survey – Field, 2009). This question did 
not differentiate between different Christian denominations, but the results (see Table 3) show 
increasing pluralism.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Extrapolating from The Church of England Research and Statistics (2016) suggests that only 
eight percent of all those professing a Christian faith attend the state-church, representing only 
4.7 percent of the total responses to the 2011 national census. Hence, this more recent census 
data shows that the state’s 1534 intention to have a state-church which all citizens attend, has 
been dissipated with increasing pluralism. The presence of differently-held beliefs suggest that 
the meaning of common-good is complex and may require a move to state-neutrality. What 
other evidence is there that the state-church relationship has moved towards “neutrality”?  
Increasing state neutrality  
Following the roll-back of the welfare state in the late-1970s and into the 1980s (associated 
with New Public Management), government has increasingly funded the charity sector, 
(including churches - faith-based entities) to deliver welfare services, requiring them to become 
alternative or the main providers of such services (Cordery, 2012; Göçmen, 2013). This is 
another example of governmentality tools to encourage charities to deliver on a conception of 
common-good. The literature has focused more on the US since President Reagan’s support of 
religious organisations as effective social service providers, the concept of Charitable Choice 
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from 1996 onwards and the Bush administration’s Compassionate Conservatism initiative from 
2001 (Göçmen, 2013). The US’ strictly separated state-church relationship makes such state 
contracting-out controversial. However, and despite a longstanding state-church in England, a 
wider range of faith-based entities also became a focus in the UK with, for example the 
Conservative Party’s social policy initiative Renewing One Nation from the mid-1990s and the 
Blair administration’s recognition that faith-based entities could improve social welfare, 
provide services and regenerate communities (Harris, 2002). The Cameron Government 
singled out churches as specifically being able to assist “socially marginalised users” (Billis, 
2001).  
Generally, secular states’ increased foci on religious entities for social services has raised 
concerns about marketisation of faith-based entities, that they will be diverted from their 
mission and secularised (Cairns et al., 2007). Nevertheless, in their case study of a Church of 
England Diocese, Cairns et al. (2007) find parish enthusiasm for building relationships and 
assisting in local communities using state funding. Further, there is concern that state 
contracting-out to faith-based organizations risks unwelcome proselytisation of service 
recipients or exclusion of those who do not share the same faith (Commission on the Voluntary 
Sector and Ageing, 2015) and therefore the common-good will not be met. Cairns et al. (2007) 
find no evidence of this, neither do Harris et al. (2005) in the British Jewish community, with 
The Centre for Social Justice (2013) noting an increased number of grants and contracts having 
been provided since 2011 to faith-based entities, especially for tackling poverty and (notes 
Snyder, 2011) in settling migrants to the UK. Churches are also ‘widely seen by policy makers 
as sources of values and commitment’, with an important contribution to make to ‘building a 
sense of local community and renewing civil society’ (Cairns et al., 2007: 413) but perhaps not 





Diverse state-church relationships exist in different jurisdictions (DiMaggio and Anheier, 
1990; Monsma and Soper, 2009). This research has applied the Monsma and Soper (2009) 
framework of the state-church relationship to extant literature and a particular case – that of 
England. Although this research is limited as it does not utilise archives (Carnegie and Napier, 
1996), a high-level view using secondary data was necessary to trace the changes in the 
relationship and governmentality  tools over an extended time period. Prior research has 
identified that states’ actions (governmentality) affect religious organisations, but this 
longitudinal study using the Monsma and Soper (2009) framework enabled further theorisation 
of relational changes, perceiving them to be formal and planned, rather than ad hoc. This 
research therefore increases understanding of the state-church relationship in England (now 
‘partial establishment’) and the steps that have been taken to address regulatory imbalance in 
today’s pluralist society. It does so, to open a debate about state-church relationships. 
The research shows that although Henry VIII established a state-church of which he could be 
head, in the current day the relationship has weakened considerably in practice, due to changing 
notions of common-good within society. Historical global pressures included the (Protestant) 
Reformation, which supported the dislocation of England from papal authority, but citizens 
also dissented from being forced to adhere to the newly established Church of England. 
Seventeenth century Enlightenment thought, English civil wars and the Glorious Revolution 
reduced the power of the monarch and the state-church. State-church disconnection escalated 
through the nineteenth century when local government devolved from it. In the twentieth 
century, increasing migration and religious pluralism, as well as secularisation of society, has 
dashed the belief that a homogeneous religion is a means for a stable society. Nevertheless, 
England has not fully embraced state-neutrality, with Monsma and Soper (2009) describing the 
church-state relationship as one of ‘partial establishment’.  
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Presentation of this case is through three distinct periods evidencing how the state-church 
relationship changed over time following external and internal pressures, and specifically 
support from Foucauldian governmentality tools. These include the financial data used for 
dissolution, political enquiry (into the church, secular charities and citizens’ censuses), 
regulation and mandatory public and parliamentary reporting by the church and charities. Table 
4 summarises these governmentality tools (Foucault 1988, 1991) over each of the periods 
described.   
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Table 4 begins with the development of a state-supported church, reflecting age-old practices 
of an inseparability between religion and state (see, for example, Ezzamel, 1997, 2002; 
Fleischer, 2010). While other studies (for example, Ezzamel, 2005, 2009, 2012; Fonfeder et 
al., 2013) analyse internal (accounting) controls rather than coercing adherence, the current 
study looks outwards. Table 4 shows that initially (1529-1537), Henry VIII limited the financial 
powers of the church to gather revenue and also, by separating and taking control of the civil 
and ecclesiastical courts, its legal power. State intervention in church life diminished the Lords 
Spirituals’ power, making the church answerable to parliament. Henry VIII also empowered 
citizens to sanction state-church mismanagement. The dissolution enriched Henry VIII through 
fines, seizure of assets and taxes. These, and other statutory arrangements are direct 
disciplinary tools (Foucault, 1988, 1991); mechanisms shaping and normalising conduct, and 
in this case, establishing and managing the state-church. Later, the state (Elizabeth I followed 
by Charles II) applied governmentality tools (uniform orders of service).  
Foucault (1988, 1991) argued that governmentality tools could achieve a common-good. The 
state attempted to encourage citizens to ‘self-regulate’ (Miller and Rose, 1990), requiring 
adherence to the state-church, as it sought to develop a stable society (Madeley, 2003). Direct 
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governmentality tools on citizens included nonconformist fines, excommunications for non-
attendance/non-adherence (Madeley, 2003), and forcing citizens to pay church- and poor-taxes. 
Indirect governmentality tools such as returns and censuses, made visible and moralised church 
attendance as a “common-good” for citizens. The disconnect between the state’s belief as to 
the common-good and that of citizens is evident from failure to achieve the state’s aim of 
universal state-church attendance (Haigh, 2001). Such controls (making visible, fining and 
taxing) compare and differentiate (Foucault, 1991; Gatti and Poli, 2014). While direct dividing 
practices were also evident in the study by Madonna et al. (2014) of The University of Ferrara, 
this study augments that research by highlighting both direct and indirect tools.  
In the second period following the Glorious Revolution, and the rise of democratic rule, the 
Toleration Act and subsequent events took the state-church relationship one step towards the 
centre of Monsma and Soper’s (2009) continuum through direct unbundling (period 2). The 
state prioritised new statistical methods (Miller and Rose, 1990) demanding that the church 
make visible its physical and financial needs (for example through Ecton’s Liber Valorum and 
nineteenth century Commissions of Enquiry). These classic governmentality tools (Foucault 
1988, 1991; see also Miller and Rose, 1990) enabled the state to initially target its monetary 
support of the church. Nevertheless, an important and visible aspect of this unbundling period 
was the progressive extrication of local government from the church. 
The state also moved to regulate charities (both religious and secular) - a direct governmentality 
tool also seen in prior literature (especially waqfs, see Melčák, 2010; Rothstein and Broms, 
2013; Yayla, 2011). Further, the state-church was required to operationalise indirect 
governmentality tools on charities (1786 returns, 1816-37 enquiries), in order to make them 
visible and to open them up for further inspection and regulation by the state. This inspection 
intensified with the establishment of the Charity Commission of England and Wales. 
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Nevertheless, the state also continued to bend to growing pluralism by acquiescing to dissenters 
who were made visible through the 1851 Census of Religious Worship. Compulsory church 
rates are a further example of an indirect governmentality tool (where the church reported on 
citizens and levied them), and the abolition of these rates in 1851 show further weakening of 
the state-church relationship and acceptance of different conceptions of the common-good. 
In the final period considered in this research, the state moves more towards neutrality. 
Nevertheless, direct governmentality is observed in the continuing requirement that important 
church staff be subject to state appointment, as the state may use these appointments to govern 
at a distance. Further, parliament holds to account the Church Commissioners (initially 
established to reform parish boundaries and manage the church). Nevertheless, for most of this 
period, the state-church enjoyed reduced (financial) reporting requirements, a benefit still held 
by a limited number of state-church entities. Lobbyists (on for example the Charities Act 2006) 
and the state have reduced the differential application of governmentality tools on charities and 
the state-church in the present era, although some aspects of the church remain invisible to the 
public.  
This final period no longer evidences the state-church applying indirect governmentality tools 
to charities as it did in the second period of this study. Secular charities are directly regulated 
and the state continues to restrict which “dissenting” churches may register as charities (for 
example the Temple of the Jedi is not deemed to be a charity). However, even unregistered 
entities may receive relief from land tax through registering a place of worship. Finally, citizens 
no longer must answer to the state-church as indirect administrator of censuses, but report 
directly to government. These censuses confirm the findings of the prior period, that the 
common-good no longer prioritises adherence to the state-church, indeed that less than five 




The objective of this research is to open a debate about the church-state relationship and the 
appropriate tools to serve the common good. It does this through the introduction of a new 
framework to analyse accounting history literature and state-church relationships – the 
Monsma and Soper (2009) continuum from strict separation of church and state, to the church 
supported by the state with an established church. The longitudinal case study highlights the 
unique historical relationship between the English state and the Church of England (initially a 
state-supported church), and demonstrates the dramatic change to the state-church relationship 
over time. This theorisation underpins the current regulatory framework in England. 
By applying Foucauldian governmentality over three distinct periods, the paper further 
theorises the Monsma and Soper (2009) framework. Governmentality tools are used to achieve 
the aims of the state-church - a belief that it would serve the common-good to ensure an 
homogeneous society (e.g. 43 Geo. 3 c.108 (1802)). This historical case study shows the 
progression of governmentality tools (Foucault, 1988, 1991) in managing the state-church 
specifically, and also charities in general. Increasing data collection, commissions of enquiry, 
imposed regulation and new accounting standards evidence direct interventions used over 
successive periods to make church and charities visible. The state previously used the church 
to also assist it in indirect governmentality on charities and citizens, but no longer is able to 
make these demands. Nevertheless, the state has also become more dependent on churches and 
charities for service delivery and to assist in developing policy in order to build a better society.  
Various governmentality tools were applied to coerce the church, charities and citizens to act 
in the common-good. This historical analysis shows that the concept of common-good has also 
changed over time. Secularisation has previously been blamed for the decline in the importance 
of the church (Laughlin, 1988; Lightbody, 2000, 2003), nevertheless in this paper, diminished 
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state-church power has also resulted from competition from other denominations (dissenters 
and Roman Catholicism in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries) and religions (pluralism); and 
the withdrawal of state support.  
The majority view of common-good (from census data) suggests the need for state-neutrality 
rather than a single state-church (see Monsma and Soper’s framework). Regulatory change 
enables public visibility of religious wealth and operations, requiring the church to account for 
its common-good contribution. Yet, the Charity Commission decides whether religious bodies 
seeking registration as a charity act in the common-good or not, limiting the entities benefiting 
from charity registration (these benefits include: protection of charitable gifts, taxation reliefs 
and the reputational benefit of ongoing Charity Commission registration). Conversely, parts of 
the state-church are excepted from the regulator’s scrutiny, suggesting that governmentality 
tools are slow and difficult to change due to vestiges of past structures. This extends the 
governmentality framework through the lens of Monsma and Soper (2009).  
Despite the arguments for state-neutrality, the state-supported church relationship developed 
from 1534 in England retains special structures that both constrain and formalise change within 
today’s state-church. Parliament governs at a distance increasing the compliance costs of the 
state-supported church. This may place the church at a disadvantage to more recently formed 
religious entities that are also recognised by the state and afforded taxation benefits. A 
rethinking of extant regulatory and parliamentary structures in this respect is required. 
Through the novel development of the Monsma and Soper (2009) framework and Foucauldian 
governmentality within that, the paper opens the state-church relationship debate within the 
accounting history literature and provides opportunities for comparative research. This 
research could be extended to other jurisdictions and to state-supported religions that are not 
Christian, to understand how different aspects of the Monsma and Soper (2009) framework 
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have operated over time, from different points on their continuum, or where the accounting 
regulation of churches conflicts with the espoused approach (e.g. Australia, the US). Another 
approach is to analyse how state-neutrality has developed (e.g. in the Netherlands) and the 
accounting and regulatory governmentality tools that underpin it. In particular, studying how 
regulators develop understandings of common-good would be useful. The state may choose to 
encourage societal stability through particular common-good notions, but this historical case 
study has shown that, over time, citizens will likely subvert the state’s direct and indirect 
attempts to impose demands that fail to attend to their concept of common-good. 
Notes 
1  Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38368526, accessed 20 July 2017. 
2  Available at https://www.bdb-law.co.uk/blogs/charity-laws/11-arent-jedis-charitable-meaning-religion-
charity-law/, accessed 20 July 2017. 
3  No doubt drawing on John Locke’s statement in 1689 on the separation of Church and Magistrate. 
4  See Maclear (1995: 34) who notes that ‘until the Revolution, the colonies of the [US] South were all to 
maintain Anglicanism as a state religion’. The Puritans in Massachusetts differed in that they not only 
supported Congregationalism but also the separation of church and state into their specific spheres of 
authority (Maclear, 1995).  
5  While in Spain in 1767 the enlightened government expelled the Jesuits, generally they had difficulties with 
delineating the state sphere from that of the religious (Alvarez-Dardet Espejo et al., 2006). Therefore, secular 
government occurred definitively later in Spain, but ‘between 1833 and 1936 [there] was a constant 
pendulum-like motion between pro-clerical and anticlerical governments’ (Fernández Roca, 2010: 243). 
6  Rothstein and Broms (2013: 479) suggest that this was the result of an ‘implicit bargain between rulers and 
their wealthy subjects. Rulers made a credible commitment to leave certain property effectively in private 
hands; in return, waqf founders agreed to supply social services, thus unburdening the state of potential 
responsibilities’. 
7  Nevertheless, non-resident clergy were still an issue in 1777 when the Clergy Residences Repairs Act 
attempted to ameliorate this, but Snell and Ell (2004) reported over 1,000 clergy remained non-resident in 
1850 (ill-health and lack of or sub-standard housing being common reasons given). 
8  From 1717, tithes were reinvested in parishes where the living (benefice) was low (initially below £35 and 
then below £50) through the Queen Anne’s Bounty which sought to “grow” parishes’ revenue-bearing assets 
to enable a reasonable income to fund priests (benefices) (Best, 1964). This fund was topped up by 
government in the nineteenth century (Best, 1964; Snell and Ell, 2004). 
9  Maclear (1995) notes that a “Comprehension Bill” failed in the Commons. Had it passed instead, it would 
have included “Moderate Dissenters” (Presbyterians) in an enlarged state-church.  
10  Gibson (2007) notes the fear of Roman Catholicism and strong arguments for (re)union of Protestants. 
Nevertheless, the Blasphemy Act 1697 meant cases could be brought against those with heretical ideas 
including those who did not believe in the Trinity, although the Toleration Act was amended in 1779 so that 
dissenters could assert belief in Scripture rather than Church of England Articles. The Doctrine of the Trinity 
Act 1813 allowed Unitarians to practise and likewise the Jewish Relief Act 1858, for Jews. The Blasphemy 
Act was repealed in 1967. (See also the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 as signalled in the Racial 
and Religious Hatred Act 2006.)  
11  These continue, with the Church Commissioners being a 1948 merger of the Ecclesiastical Commission and 
Queen Anne’s Bounty. Yet, the Church Commissioners has been a registered charity only since 2009 (see 
next sub-section). However the Church of England General Synod can pass “measures” that have the same 
status as Acts of Parliament. The Queen opens each quinquennial Session of the Church of England General 
Synod.  
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12  The Ecclesiastical Commissioners are now termed “Church Commissioners”. They comprise the 
Archbishops of Canterbury and York, all bishops, deans of Canterbury, St Paul and Westminster, the Lord 
Chancellor, first Lord of the Treasury, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord President of the Council, Home 
Secretary, Lord Chief Justice, Master of the Rolls, two judges and lay members that the crown and 
Archbishop of Canterbury have appointed. Laughlin (1988) suggested that over 40 percent of parishes’ 
income derives from this entity’s investments and expenditure comprises staff and building maintenance. 
13  While charities were able to claim relief from many taxes (including income tax), it was a dissenting church 
that brought the classic Pemsel Case. In 1886 the treasurer of the Moravian Church (Pemsel) had his 
application for relief from income tax disallowed on the basis that income had not been applied for 
charitable purposes. Lord Macnaghten was required to define charitable purposes as the 1799 Act providing 
exemptions had not done so when it had been passed (the relevant Act at the time was the Income Tax Act 
1842). He stated: ‘“Charity” in its legal sense comprised four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of 
poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other 
purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads’ (Gousmett, 2009: 428). 
14  While Roman Catholic churches were exempt from the 1853 and 1855 Amendment Act initially (s. XLVII, 
extended by Acts in 1856, 1857 and 1858), they were subject to its provisions from 1859. Further 
persecution against Roman Catholic trusts (on the basis that they were believed to have “superstitious” 
objectives) was disallowed in the 1860 Roman Catholic Charities Act. Roman Catholic Churches were not, 
however, on the list of excepted or exempted charities in the Charities Act 2006, but arguably could be 
excepted as Places of Worship (1855 Act); further due to their proclivity to organise on a Diocesan-wide 
basis, they typically register as large charities (Morgan, 2009a). 
15  Places of Worship were exempted from compliance until the Charities Act 2011. In s. 30, previously 
excepted charities (including entities registered as places of worship) must register if their income exceeds 
£100,000 and report in the normal way. The limit will be reduced over time (Morgan, 2017). However, 
merely being a registered Place of Worship does not automatically make an entity a charity (available at: 
https://www.bdb-law.co.uk/blogs/charity-laws/11-arent-jedis-charitable-meaning-religion-charity-law/ 
accessed 20 July 2017). 
16  In 1850 Pope Pius IX appointed the Archbishop of Westminster and established twelve episcopal sees 
throughout the UK (replacing the previous eight established in 1840 and the four before then (Maclear, 
1995). Nevertheless, restrictions continued. Protestants were not allowed to join Roman Catholic schools, 
and monastic orders or endowment of schools and universities were prohibited.  
17  Early episcopal visitation returns collected at a diocesan level in the state-church and surveys by individual 
denominations and religions provided some data. Field (2009: 7) also notes that the armed forces have 
gathered data on their staff’s religion (Army since 1860, the Royal Navy since 1839 and the Royal Air Force 
since 1863) and that prisoners likewise have been surveyed ‘in the 1860s and 1906, and annually from 
1962’. 
18  The House of Commons resolved on 19 June 1829 to make a ‘A Return of the number of Places of Worship 
not of the Church of England in each Parish, distinguishing as far as possible of what sector or persuasion, 
and the total number of each sect in England and Wales’ (Snell and Ell, 2004: 259). Most of this data was 
destroyed in the 1834 House of Parliament fire. 
19  However, Snell and Ell (2004) note that the Independents formed the Congregational Union of England and 
Wales in 1832 to create some coherent ideals and the Baptist Union formed in 1813. They still retain levels 
of independence at parish level. 
20  It had also to contend with the separation of the Church in Wales (under the Welsh Church Act 1914) from 
the Church of England. This meant that Welsh Bishops were no longer entitled to sit in the House of Lords 
as Lords Spiritual and no longer received tithes from the state.  
21  This took effect for financial years starting on or after 1 March 1996, making it mandatory to prepare SORP 
accounts and to file them from 1997. 
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